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STATEJ\1ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This was a civil action brought under the provisions of Sec-
tons 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 , as 
amended, whereby the Plaintiff-Appellant, Apex Lumber Com-
pany, seeks payment for the unpaid value of materials supplied 
by plaintiff to the Comanche Construction Company, and used 
in the construction of four pole-type turkey brooding barns 
on land owned by the defendants-respondents, Moroni Feed 
Company. D. A. Shand, Howard Willardsen and Richard Jen. 
sen. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VFR COURT 
Plaintiff, Apex Lumber Company, commenced four indi-
vidual actions in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, against Comanche Construction Company, Raymond 
Clark and the four defendants, Moroni Feed Company, D. A. 
Shand, Howard \Villardsen and Richard Jensen. Comanche Con-
struction Company and Raymond Clark were non-residents of 
Utah. On the defendants' motion for a change of venue, the 
matters were set down to the Seventh Judicial District Court, 
Sanpete County. 
On stipulation of counsel, the four cases \\'ere joined for 
purposes of trial and tried before a jury. The court propounded 
a special verdict to the jury, containing six \\'ntten interroga-
tories; an<l based upon the jury's ans\\'ers to said interroga-
tories, the court rendered judgment against the plaintiff for no 
cause of action against the defendants. 
Plaintiff mond for a directed verdict in fa,·or of the plain-
tiff against the defendants. Motion for directed ,-erdict was de-
riled and overruled. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial. 
which was heard June 8, 1965. The court took the same under 
advisement at that time. On June 22, 1965, the court ruled on 
plaintiff's motion for new trial b:· denying same. Plaintiff ap-
peals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the lower court's judgment and 
that this court adjudicate: 
1. That plaintiff never received foll pa:·ment for the m~-
terials use<l in the construction of pole-type turkey brooder 
barns on land belonging to the defendants. 
2. That under the provisions of 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 of Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, plaintiff is entitled to hold 
the defendants personally liable for the unpaid value of ma-
terials used in constructing the buildings on their lands. 
3. That acceptance of contractor's unsecured promissory 
notes did not constitute payment of the amount owing on the 
materials. 
4. That the mere statement of plaintiff's employee that 
contractor was not in default with the plaintiff would not cre-
ate z.n estoppel barring plaintiff's recovery from defendants . 
. ~. That, as a matter of law, plaintiff is entitled to recover 
the amounts prayed for in its complaints, or, that failing, the 
c:ascs remanded for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the summer of 1 960, a contractor from Minne-
sGta b:· the name of Raymond Clark, and holding himself out as 
President of Comanche Construction Company, Inc., (T-10) 
contracted with se\·eral turkey farmers living in Sanpete Coun-
ty, Utah, to build pole-type turkey brooding barns for them. 
The fact that Mr. Clark at this time had not incorporated his 
company and did not incorporate it until after the defendants' 
buildings were completed was not known by either plaintiff or 
defendants until later. (T-56) Comanche Construction Company 
transferred men and equipment from Minnesota to Utah and 
commenced work in October of 1960. (T-9) 
Plaintiff's first witness was Guy L. Pittman, an employee 
of Comanche Constrnction Company, who came to Utah as 
the Supervisor of Sales and Construction. (T-9) Mr. Pittman, 
with authority to hire and fire the men, had the responsibility 
to see that the buildings under contract were built and to sell 
other buildings. (T- io) 
With the help of Exhibit 15, Mr. Pittman's undisputed 
testimony (T-38, T-45 through T-51) showed that Comanche 
Construction Company constructed pole-type hams for the fol-
lowing people, starting and finishing the jobs on the dates set 
opposite their names: 
Jobs Started Finished 
I. Rulon Sowby Oct. I 8, 1960 Nov. 30, 1960 
~ Ray Olsen Oct. 2 3, 1960 Dec. 2, 1960 
3. La Mont Blackham Oct. 24, 1960 Dec. 2 I, 1960 
4. Cliff Blackham Oct. 29, 1960 Dec. 14, 1960 
5· Movle Blackham Nov. 5, 1960 Dec. 2 I, 1960 
6. Mark Christensen Oct. 26, 1960 Jan. 7, 1961 
7. Howard \Villardsen Dec. I 2, 1960 Jan. 24, 1961 
8. D. A. Shand Dec. 13, 1960 Jan. 2 5, 1961 
9. Richard Jensen Dec. 14, 1960 Feb. I 8, 1961 
1 o. Moroni Feed Company Jan. I 2, 1961 Mar. I, 1961 
I I. Warren Goates Feb. 8, 1961 Mar. r, 1961 
I 2. Bruce Barton Feb. 8, 1961 Mar. 14, 1961 
13· Dick Barker .\I ar. I), I 96 I Mav 3, 1961 
\Vith Exhibits 1 through 6, Mr. Pittman testified that he su-
pervised the construction of a building 76 feet wide and 200 
feet long with a 30 foot addition for defendant, l\foroni Feed 
Company. He explained in det;.iil \vhat the building looks like 
and the type and quantity of materials used in it. (T- 1 1 through 
T-26) Mr. Pittman's undisputed testimony was that the mate-
rial used in the construction of the building was supplied by 
plaintiff; that this material included poles, steel, lumber and 
hardware. (T-26) 
1\lr. Pittman further testified that the three buildings con-
structed for defendants, D. A. Shand, Howard Willardsen and 
Richard Jensen, were 76 feet by 150 feet. With the help of Ex-
hibits 7 through 1 2, he detailed the type and quantity of mate-
rials which included the poles, steel, lumber and hardware; that 
all of this material w1s supplied hy plaintiff. (T-27 through 
T-38) 
Mr. Pittman sometimes signed the farmers to a contract, 
and regarding the procedure for ordering the materials testified: 
"A: When I sold these buildings, I sent the copy of the 
contract to Hopkins, Minnesota to Comanche Con-
struction Company. I gave them the size and the spe-
4 
cifications on it, and they sent the purchase orders to 
my knowledge to Apex Lumber Company and from 
there we received the lumber. · 
"Q: Did you have a snpervisory capacity over the purchase 
orders' 
"A: No. 
''A· It came directly fiom Hopkins, l\'linnesota, unless I 
had a shortage on the job I would call Apex Lumber 
in Salt Lake City, and they would deliver on the 
shortage of materials." (T-39) 
!\Ir. Pittman's further nnchallen'.!ed testimony was that they 
had very little material left over on the jobs, cm-offs and this 
rvpe of thing. (T-39) 
At the completion of the jobs the defencbnts, in each in-
stance, paid Mr. Pittman in full. The checks were sent back to 
the head office qf Comanche Consf"ruction Company at Hop-
kins, Minnesota. Regarding the giving- of lien waivers, the pro-
cedure was not the same in all instances. On occasion he gave 
lien \\ aivers to the property owners. Sometimes these lien waiv-
ers bore the signarnre of the suppliers and other times they 
\\·e~e signed only hy him. It would depend on what he had 
been supplied by Comanche Construction Comp<my. \Vhen he 
gave lien waivers signed only by him. it was with the stipula-
tion that materials were not paid for by Comanche Construc-
rion Company. (T-43) 
YVhen questioned on whether or not he had received pay-
ment from the defendants, l\1r. Pittman answered: 
"A: I did. The fact is we may have had a few hours work 
left on some of the buildings when these people paid 
for them. There was no anrument whatsoever with 
anyone about paving for these buildings." (T-40) 
Under cross-examination, Mr. Pittman testified that the 
rost of the material in these buildinP"s was roughly between sixtv i.'.:I ~ ~ ., 
:md sixty-five cents a square foot. (T-76) 
On redirect examination, Mr. Pittman testified all of the 
steel shipped into Sanpete County from Illinois was three inch 
corruaated steel and this steel was used in the construction of 
the fi~t six buildings. The steel was used in the four buildings of 
the defendants was t\vo and one-half inch steel. (T-78) 
Questioned concerning material belonging to Comanche 
Com:truction Company that he might have sold, he was asked 
"Q: You testified some of the materials left over from th 
. b c JO s were sold. Any material left over from a job in 
Sanpete County sold to anyone in your knowledge? 
"A: Not to my knO\vledge. Usually we was always short 
~ mrteri~. · 
"Q: And what would you do in case you were short? 
"A: Call Apex Lumber Company and have it delivered 
out." (T-78) 
When asked nhout fie crc\\'s moving the materials from job 
site to job site, he responded as follows: 
"Q: And wns all of the material at this time being pur-
chased from Apex Lumber? 
"A: It was. 
"Q: So whether it was taken from Jensen to someone else 
and brought back it was, all of the material was orig 
inally pu~chased from Apex? ' 
"A: It all came from Apex Lumber." (T-80) 
The next two witnesses were Dnrrell Ben Tucker and Pite; 
Vander V ::iart, both ernp!oy·cd at plaintiff's lumber yard. They 
testified that during January, 1961 they personall_v, with one 
other driver, delivered the lumber and steel to the sites of the 
Willardsen building, the Shand building, the Jensen buildin'.!· 
and Moroni Feed Company building. (T-87 through T-95) 
Plaintiff's next witness was J. \V. Child, General Mana?,"er 
of the plaintiff. He testified that in September or October of 
1960 plaintiff was requested by Raymond Clark to furnish quo-
tations on materials. Plaintiff responded znd in October, 1960 
received purchase orders (Exhit;it 24) from Comanche Con-
struction Company for materials t:i (;e used in the construction 
of six pole-type buildings in the Sanpete County area. . 
Upon completion of the first six jobs, plaintiff received 
purchase orders from Comanche Construction Company for 
four additional buildings. (Exhibits 2 5 through 2 8 are these pur-
chase orders.) It was the material supplied by plaintiff on these 
four purchase orders that went into the buildings owned by de-
6 
fendants. (T-100 through T-rn4) 
Mr. Child further testified that because material was or-
dered by the construction crews to make up shortages, the jobs 
could not be billed to Comanche Construction Company until 
they were completed. Prices on all materials were pre-arranged, 
(T-104) and as agreed with Comanche Construction Company, 
plaintiff was to be paid at the completion of the job. (T- rn5) 
A summary of Comanche Construction Compan:/s account 
was given by plaintiff in a letter dated January 30, 1961. (Ex-
hibit 41) On February 14, 1951, plaintiff received a $10,000.00 
payment from Comanche Construction Company, and on Feb-
ruarv 2 1, 1961 plaintiff again wrote Comanche Construction 
Company to show how the payment had been allocated and to 
bring- the account current. (Exhibit 42) Plaintiff maintained a 
ledger card on Comanche Construction Compan\· (Fxhihit i.9) 
\I hich Mr. Child explained at T-rn7: 
''A: This is a copy of the ledger card, commonly referred 
to as an account receivable card. hctw<::cn Apex Lumber 
and Hardware and Comanche Constructio:i Company. 
The debit items show the items that were sold to Co-
manche Construction Compan:: and the credit items on 
the ledger card show the items the Comanche Con-
struction Company paid to Apex Lumber and Hard-
"·are Company. And be;.'ond this we show payments 
received of $2,ooo on October 20, and this was the be-
ginning date, as I mentioned, on the first six jobs, and 
this $z,ooo represented a deposit that we required of 
Comanche Construction Company before we began 
shipping to them because of their unproven credit with 
us and pending our credit inve~tigation of them. On 
February or December 6 the\· paid $1,833.54, which 
\vould ~orrespond with one of the purchase orders on 
those original six jobs. On December 16, they paid 
$3.667.08, which corresponds with two of the purchase 
orders on the first six jobs. And January 10 they paid 
$z,353.46, which again corresponds with one of the 
large jobs and the lumber furnished. February 15 they 
paid $6,628.75, which cleared these original six jobs." 
The next payment was the last payment received by plain-
tiff from Comanche Construction Company. It was for $8 _ 
000.00, and ,\Ir. Child testified that at Raymond Clark's di-
rection the Bruce Barton job was given full credit and the bal-
ance of the p:iyment 'vas applied to the defendants' jobs: 
''THE \VITNESS: Thank you, sir. Mr. Clark came into 
my office and to me personally handed a check for 
$8,ooo, and this was the final payment I received from 
Comanche Construction Company. This was on the 
20th day of l\1arch, just six day-s after Mr. Barton·s 
job was completed. And ,\fr. Clark informed me to 
apply this eight thous:m<l dollars to .\1r. Barton's 1ob. 
Therefore, the five thousand three hundred seventv-
eight dollars 'vas credited here and the balance of tl~is 
money, plus the four thousand one hundred eleven dol-
lars collected prior were prorated to the jobs of the 
Hatchery, Shand's, \Villardsen's and Jensen's as being 
the only other four jobs outstanding with Apex Lum-
ber. After receiving these payments, the amount still 
due from Mr. Shand's iob was fortv-seven hundred 
) . 
forty-three; J\lr. \Villardsen's was forty-six ninety-sev-
en; Mr. Jensen's forty-nine forty; the Hatchery forty-
six seventv-se,-en, and :\Ir. Barton's job, per the in-
structions of Mr. Clark, was paid in full.'' (T-1 17) 
Mr. Child was guestioned as to 'vhat procedure plaintiff 
used in deciding to sue these particular defendants, and 8t 
T-125, with the use of the blackboard, an.s,vered: 
"THE WITNESS: Thank you for your diligence. Ac-
cording to Apex Lumber's record, and I will not start 
with the first jobs because they do not apply, but the 
later jobs were completed on the follmving dates. Let's 
start with Christensen's on Tanuarv 7. Then Mr. 
Shand's was completed on Ja
0
nuary. 2 5 . .\fr. \Villard-
sen's on January 24. Mr. Jensen's on February 18. Mo-
roni Hatchery was completed on !\larch 1. Mr. Bar:-
on's job was completed on March 1+ J\lr. Goates, this 
is a Lehi, Utah, job, was completed on March 1, and 
Mr. Barker's, which is the Kearns job, was completed 
on May 3. These are the completion dates and the 
dates which establishes to us the precedent as to which 
were materials to be billed out first and which were 
last. After Comanche Construction Company took out 
their bankruptcy, lawsuits were then instigated against 
Barker for his job, Mr. Goates for his job, f\fr. Barton 
was issued full credit, as I mentioned a minute ago, so 
Mr. Barton's job was paid for. Now Mr. Barker and 
Mr. Goates both settled their lawsuit. They, with Apex 
Lumber got together and we settled the amount and 
got the money from both of these brethren, both of 
these gentlemen. Then we took the total amount due, 
which is nineteen thousand dollars, and applied it to the 
very next jobs, which was Moroni Hatchery, Jensen's, 
Willardsen's and Shand's, which left this one out be-
cause these four would satisfy' the entire judgment that, 
excuse me, the entire liability· that Apex had against Co-
manche. There was nothing hit or miss :>.!iout it. These 
were settled." 
(Exhibit 39 is copy of blackboard exhibit.) 
Plaintiff's extended billings to Comanche Construction 
Company (Exhibits 30 through 3 3) detail the unpaid value of 
the materials in each of the defendants' buildings. (T-120 and 
T-121.) 
Commenting on the figure that Mr. Pittman used in his 
testimony of sixty cents per square foot as the basis for figur-
ing the cost of the material, Mr. Child diagrammed on the 
blackboard another method of arriving at the unpaid value for 
which plaintiff is suing defendants. (T- 1 10 through T-1 18) (Ex-
hibit ) 7 is an exact duplicate of the computations put on the 
blackboard.) 
When Comanche Construction Company failed to send 
more money Mr. Child testified of his efforts to collect it: 
"A: Y ~s'. There were several efforts made to collect this 
money. We contacted Mr. Clark very frequently; made 
telephone calls, trips, engaged a lawyer, and one trip 
when ~fr. Clark ·was in Salt Lake and I got him in my 
office and he committed that he had coming to him 
9 
within one week five thousand dollars :md within two 
weeks he told me he had sixteen thousand dollars corn-
ing to. him. And so .I asked him if he would object 
to gwmg me a promissory note promising to me that 
he would pay this money when he collected it. And 
so J\1r. Clark wrote out two promissory notes, one for 
five thousand dollars :md one for sixteen thousand, and 
the five thousand one was for seven days only because 
he said he was going to collect his money in seven davs, 
and the other one was for seventeen days because ·he 
said he was going to coliect the sixteen .thousand dol-
lars in tv,·o "·eeb from some other source. And I had 
him give me these two promissory notes which would, 
I felt, obligate him to gi\·e me this adclitio111l moncr 
"·hen he ~ot it collected. And then finallv we enaaaed 
~· . b ::i 
a lawyer in connection with the defendants to this trial 
and brought suit ag:i'.nst i\fr. Clark and Comanche Con-
struction Compan:· and he took out hankruptc:' and 
went insolvent." (T-1z1) 
When asked if he had taken the r.otes as satisfaction for the 
money owing, Mr. Child answered: 
"A: Never. In no case were the notes ever credited on to 
Comanche Construction's account. They were taken 
only to secure the payment of the funds he had prom-
ised him, but I certainly did not take them in payment 
of the account." (T-124) 
Mr. Child further testified that neither Ravmond Clark nor 
Comanche Construction Company ever denied owing this mon-
ey. That on March 31, 1961, an audit of Comanche Construc-
tion Company records conducted by an independent firm in 
,\ 1innesota revealed only a small difference of approximately 
$160.00 out of a total amount owing of $q.,o.p.oo. (Exhibit 3-1) 
The Barker job \vhich finished May 3, 196 1 brought the amount 
owing to over $Jo,ooo.oo. (T-12 3) . 
On cross-examination, Mr. Child testified that though plain-
tiff employed a man by the name of H. ]. Rasmussen dur'.ng 
1961 as a bookkeeper, he did not have authority to issue hen 
waivers on behalf of the plaintiff. (T-149) 
JO 
Defendants' first witness was Charles Devon Beck, an em-
ployee of Comanche Construction Company from November, 
1960 until the spring of 1 961. Mr. Beck testified that material 
was moved by Comanche Construction Company from job to 
job, On cross-examination, he testified that Comanche Con-
struction used two small trucks, one a ton and a half and the 
other one a pickup, to move the material. (T-184) 
Defendants' next witness \Vas Mark Christensen. He testified 
that he was Assistant to the Manager of Moroni Feed Company 
and also a turkey raiser. That Comanche Construction Company 
had built a barn for him. During January and part of February, 
1961 he had loaned his truck to Comanche Construction Com-
pany. Periodically he saw his truck with materials on it but 
did not know where the material was being taken. (T-185 and 
T-186) 
Mr. Bruce Bartrm testified next for the defendants to the 
eff cct that he had Comanche Constr•.1ctinn Company build a 
pole-tvpe barn for protection for his s 11c~~p. He did not request 
a bond from Comanche Construction Company, did not ask for 
no;· receive lien waivers. (T-189) 
Next witness for the defendants 'Was Clifford Blackham, a 
turkev grower and Manager of the ;\Ioroni Feed Company's 
Hatchery and Brooder Farms. Mr. Blackham negotiated with 
.\1r. Raymond Clark for the construction of two buildings, one 
for himself and one for Moroni Feed Company. (T-190) On 
January 23, 1961, Mr. Shand and Mr. Willardsen came to his 
office concerned with whether or not they should pay Co-
manche Construction Company the final payment for their 
buildings. (T-192) They decided to call suppliers to find out 
if things "·ere in order to make the fin'.11 payment. l\fr. Black-
ham testified: 
"A: \Vell, I placed a call to Scherer Brothers Lumber Com-
pany in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Apex Lumber 
Company in Salt Lake Cit~,- to :\fr. Rasmussen, because 
Mr. Rasmussen had signed m~· lien waiver from Apex 
on my own personal building. At the time I gave my 
deposition I didn't remember who I spoke to, but when 
I checked it out with the telephone companv and got 
11 
their information I had talke<l to ;\Ir. Rasmussen. And 
;\Ir. R;1srnussen told us, told me that the accounts were 
clear ,rnd it was clear to go ahca<l and make the fmal 
payrr:cnt to Apex Lumber Comp:my. And on this basis 
of this information these men went out and paid for 
the buildings and \\ e p:1id for our Feed Com pan\· 
building, the firnl p,1_n 11ents." (T-195) · 
He testified that on r:1:::: basis of this information, he ad-
vised l\lr. Shand and l\Ir. \\'ilbrdscn to make the final pa:-:ments 
to Comanche Construction Cumpan:-;. He further testified that 
it was on the basis of this connrsatioi1 \\·ith .\Ir. Rasmussen that 
Moroni Feed Compan:· paid Corna'lchc Comtruction in full 
On cross-cxaminati<m, he ~rill mJintJined th;1t, cnn thonrrh the 
date of tl~e com-cr~;ation \\ ith .\Ir. Ras111msen took place J~nuan 
2 3fd and 1\loroni Feed Compan<s job \1·as not completeJ um.ii 
March 1st, (T-:o-1-) his fears Jud been alleviated and he made 
the final pa~·ments on relia•1cc of ,\Ir. Rasmmscn's statement 
He couldn't remember whecher .\Ir. lbsmus~cn had informer! 
him that all the materials that \\"Cnt into the jobs had been ?aid 
for. He stated that the reason the:-· had made the phone call 
was for some protection; and \\ he!1 he ''as asked \\·hether he 
had requested a lien \\"ai\·er from Coi11:111che Construction Com-
pany, he answered: 
"A: It has been too long. I can't remember \\·hether I mace 
a request or not. I would assume that I may have done. 
but I don't know. I just don't remember that. 
"Q: \Vould this be because you rcali1e the importance of 
this lien waver? 
"A: I do, yes. 
"Q: But you didn't thi:ik it was important enough to get 
it in writing. Is that right? 
"A: Yes. I think I would kno\\. to get it in \\"riting .. \ladle 
I would assume the telephone call from the people 
would be a~surance to me." (T-2 11) 
Richard Jensen testified on direct examination that Co· 
manche Construction C.:impany built a pole barn for him. "When 
his building was finished, he had talked to Art Shand ahout 
whether t; pay Comanche Construction. He was worried be-
I 2 
cause Comanche Construction Company was behind in their la-
bor payments. (T-220) Shand had told him that they had made 
an investigation and as far as he could see, it wa~ alright to 
pay. (T-214) He also testified that he did not ask Mr. Pittman 
for a lien waiver for the materials. (T-219) He remembers also 
talking to 1\fr. Blackham. He remembered that he talked to Don 
Tibbs, his attorney, but could not remember what ,l\fr. Tibbs 
advised f-jm. On Shand's advice, he went ahead and made final 
payment. 
Direct examination of defendants' witness, Howard \Villard-
sen, re\·ealed that he contracted with Comanche Construction 
Company for a pole-type turkey brooder barn; that the pole 
barn was built in conformity with the contract. (T-223) That 
he knew there was a question about some labor payments owed 
by Comanche Construction Company. For this reason he wor-
ried about the solvency of Comanche Construction Company, 
and before making final payment, he and D. A. Shand went 
tn J\Ir. Blackham's office, and concernin§[ the telephone call he 
said: 
"A: Well, of course I don't kno\,., I didn't speak myself, 
but \Ve received assurance from Cliff that it was all 
right with Comanche Construction, \Vith Apex Lumber 
Company if we paid Comanche because apparently 
they were solvent and they had no concern about Co-
manche paying their bills. Certainly I wouldn't have 
paid it if I hadn't of had this assurance." (T-2 2 5) 
He made final pa_vment January 28, 1961. 
On cross-examination, }\fr. Willardsen testified that he 
knew Comanche Construction Company was having trouble 
paying their bills at a lumber y-ard at Ephraim; that a co-op 
senrice station held a bill for oil products against Comanche 
Construction Company. (T-229) He also remembered being 
told bv Mr. Pittman that Comanche Construction Company 
would' have to have the money before he could get the lien 
waiver; that he understood that the money was needed to pay 
plaintiff before Pittman could give him the lien waivers. 
(T-231) 
On direct examination, D. A. Shand testified that Comanche 
I~ 
Construction C?mpany constructed a building on his propeny; 
that he made fo1::1l payment January 28, 1961, which included 
the cost of some ventilation equipment. He testified that he 
made several im1uiries into the position of Comanche Construc-
tion before making final pavment, e\'en g-oing- so far as takina a 
" L ..._ tJ 
trip to Spring City to talk to 1\1r. Beck to find out whether or 
not 1\lr. Beck had received his wages. 
\\'hen asked by his attornc) : 
"Q: 'Vhat else did you do? 
"A: \Veil, the \\·ord was that there was several small bilb 
owed in Ephraim; that they had had a bank account 
in the Ephraim Bank and it was dclinciuent; their 
checks weren't good and there was several people owed 
that didn't have their money. I got in touch \vith Mr. 
Willardsen, we talked about it several days, :!nd one 
day when it \Vas right clmc to where we were obli-
gated to pay these, we had signed a contract to pay 
these, pay for this building as soon as it was completed, 
because it was explained to us that they needed the 
money to pay for the material. They told us that be-
fore we ever signed the contract. YVe went up and 
talked it over with Cliff Blackham." (T-235 and T-
236) 
He further testified that he called his attornev, Don Tibbs, 
and asked what he should do and was told not to pay it; how-
ever, he still felt obligated to pay the bills, and after the tele-
phone conversation in Mr. Blackham's office paid the bill. He 
talked to Jensen, and Jensen relied upon him to get the informa-
tion because Jensen was out on the farm. 
On cross-examination, when asked what his attorney's ad-
vice had been, he answered: 
"A: Well, I don't know that he told me to get a lien waiv-
er. He told me that I, that I, he must have tol<l me 
that I should have some proof of pa~'ment or some re-
lease anyway. 
Q: Did you request this of Mr. Pittman before vou paid 
him? 
"A: Yes, I did. 
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"Q: Did he give you anything at all? 
"A: He gave me a lien waiver on the labor. 
"Q: He did not give you any other type of lien waiver? 
"A: I asked for another type of lien waiver and he informed 
me that he couldn't give it to me until he had paid the 
bill. 
"Q: So in line with i\fr. Pittman's testimonv, vou were 
another one that he told that, Mr. vVillar.dse~ testified 
also that, you were another one that he told that the 
materials were not paid for at the time that you gave 
him the money for your contract. Is th::t right? 
"A: \Vell, that was the assumption. 
"Q: That is correct, though, isn't it? 
"A: \\'ell, I don't know. I don't think he s;1id that in those 
kind of word<>. No. 
"Q: \Vell, now. ue you-he told you that he could not give 
you the lien waivers until he paid for the material. Is 
that right? Is that what you testified previonsly? 
"A: Well, I guess that is right. 
"Q: So is it a logical assumption that the materials were 
not paid for then at the time mu paid ~·("mr final pay-
ment? 
"A: \Vell, I guess so. I guess it is." (T-241) 
He further testified that at the time he paid the bill he 
knew the materials had come from the plaintiff. (T-243) 
Defendants' last witness, Lee Hermansen, testified that during 
1960 and 1961 he operated a lumber compan~· at Ephraim, Utah; 
that he did business with Comanche Construction Company, 
selling them building materials and tools. Mr. Pittman was the 
one who purchased from him for Com1riche Construction Com-
pany. (T-251) 
Comanche Construction Compan~· became delinquent in 
their bill and to trv to get straightened up, he testified that 
he went up to Draper, Utah, and picked up some steel sheets 
that were supposed to belong to Comanche Construction Com-
pany. (T-242 and T-253) 
On cross-examination, Mr. Hermansen admitted that in 
fact the steel belonged to Apex Lumber Company, and that on 
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~he advice of his attorney he paid Apex Lumhcr Company for 
it .. (T-256) As to.the typ~ of business his lumber company did 
with Comanche Construction Company, he testified: 
"Q: And what type of materials did vou se!P Tools, vou 
mentioned. · 
"A: Well, I sold a lot of tools. 
"Q: A lot of tools? 
"A: Yes, and I made a lot of tin work for them. 
"Q: Manufactured stuff? 
"A: Yes, and they bought a lot of plastic cement to seal 
their roofs. I did all their saw filing.'' (T-25.:J.) 
On rebuttal, i\lr. J. \V. Child testified that on the dav Mr. 
Blackham talked with ~.lr. Rasmussen, a check of Co~anche 
Construction Company's ledger card (Exhibit 29) would have 
shown: 
"A: On January 23, 1960, Cmmnche Construction had a 
credit balance with Apex Lumber and Hardware of 
sixteen thousand four hundred eighty-two dollars 
eighty-three cents. This means that they had paid in to 
the lumber company sixteen thousand dollars more 
than the jobs that had been completed and billed to 
them as of January 2 3. 
''THE COURT: '-''hat year w::is that' 
"THE WITNESS: 1961." (T-261) 
(Exhibit 54) 
He also testified that H. J. Rasmussen was only a book-
keeper; that his title and total responsibility was doing book 
work. As to his authority to sign lien waivers, !\Ir. Child said: 
"A: No. As I testified before, he had no authority to sign 
lien waivers and he had no authority to sign checks to 
bind the corporation. He had no obligation from the 
stockholders or no authoritv from the stockholders to 
jeopardize the corporation ~r free the corporation from 
obligations or liabilities. The only possibility would 
have been, and I note that both of these are signed on 
exactly the same day, and at the same time, so the 
onlv answer is that it was done at nw direction." (T-. . 
266 and T-267) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE PROVES THAT 
PLAINTIFF NOT ONLY SUPPLIED THE MATERIAL 
USED BY THE CONTRACTOR IN CONSTRUCTING 
THE BUILDINGS ON DEFENDANTS' LAND, BUT RE-
CEIVED ONLY PARTIAL PAYMENT FOR THE VALUE 
OF SAID MATERIALS. 
The undisputed testimony of Guy L. Pittman, the Gen-
eral Supervisor for Comanche Construction Company in Utah 
at the time the pole-type turkey brooding buildin3s were con-
structed on dcf endants' land, is clear and unequivocal. Testify-
ing at T-26, Mr. Pittman stated that the poles, steel, lumber 
and hardware materials used in constructing the ,\toroni Feed 
Compan~· building \Vere supplied by plaintiff. Likewise at T-33, 
;\lr. Pittman testifie<l that the poles, steel, lumber and hardware 
materials used in constructing the buildings on D. A. Shand's, 
Howard 'Villardsen's and Richard Jensen's property came from 
plaintiff. 
The defendant not only failed to challenge ,\Ir. Pittman's 
testimony on this point; they did not attempt to establish an-
other source for the materials. Their witness, Mr. Hermansen, 
the only materialman besides plaintiff \vho testified, admitted 
that his business with Comanche Construction Company was 
mostly in supplying tools and doing tin work. (T-254) 
i\Ir. J. \V. Child, General Manager 0f plaintiff, testified 
that the last payment received by plaintiff from Comanche 
Construction Compan:-· was $8,ooo.oo on 'llarch 20, 1961. De-
fendants did not attempt to show that plaintiff received pay-
ment in cash from Comanche Constrnction Company at any 
later date. 
Defendants did not attempt to show that the materials 
\hown on Exhibits 30 through 3 3 were not of the value claimed. 
Rule 49(a) of the Ctah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
"SPECIAL VERDICTS AND INTERROGATORIES-(a) 
Special Verdicts. The court ma~· require a jury to return 
only a special verdict in the form of a special written find-
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ing u_ron each ~ssue of. fact. In th2t event the court mav 
submit . to the Jury wr_1ttcn interrogatories Sll5ceptible ~f 
categoncal or other bnef answer or may submit written 
forms of the several speci_al findings \vhich might properly 
be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may u;e 
such o~her m_eth?d of
1 
submitting the issues and reg~iring 
the wntten f mdmgs tnercon as it deems most appropriate. 
The court shall give to the jury such explanation and in-
struction concerning the matter thus submitted as may be 
necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon ·each 
issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised 
by the pleadings or by the e\'idence, each party waives his 
right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless 
before the jurv retires he demands its submission to the 
jury. As to an issc1e omitted without such demand the 
court may make a finding; or. if it fails to do so, it shall 
be deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judg-
ment on the special verdict." 
The defendants requested the trial court to propound ~ 
l1uestion to the jury of whether or not more money was claim-
ed by the plaintiff from the defendants than was actually due 
the plaintiff for materials sold to Conunche Construction Com-
pany. (R-33) Since the defendants introduced no evidence of 
any kind to create a basis for such a question the trial court 
refused to direct the question to the jm~·· \Vhen the defendants 
failed to raise an objection, it is clear that under Rule 49(a) the 
defendants had abandoned any doubt the~- might have had that 
the value of the materials claimed by plaintiff was unreason-
c11 ;I~. 
POINT II 
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE PROVES THAT UN-
DER THE PROVISIONS OF 14-2-1 AND 14-2-2 OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, PLAINTIFF 
HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
FOR THE UNPAID VALUE OF MATERIALS SUPPLIED 
BY PLAINTIFF AND CSED IN THE CONSTRUCTIOJ\ 
OF BUILDINGS ON DEFENDANTS' LAND. 
Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, provides: 
"14-2-1. The owner of any interest in land entering into a 
contract, involving $soo or more, for the construction, ad-
dition to, or alteration or repair of, any building, structure 
or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is 
cor.m1enced, obtain from the contractor a ·bond in a sum 
equal to the contract price, with good and sufficient sure-
ties, conditioned for the faithful performance of the con-
tract and prompt payment for material furnished and labor 
performed under the contract. Such bond shall run to the 
owner and to all other persons as their interest may appear; 
and any person who has furnished materials or performed 
labor for or upon any such building, structure or improve-
ment, payment for which has not been made, shall have a 
direct right of action against the sureties upon such bond 
for the reasonable value of the materi'.1ls furnished or labor 
performed, not exceeding, however, in an~· case the prices 
agreed upon; which right of action shall accrue forty days 
after the completion, or abandonment, or default in the 
performance, of the work provided for in the contract. 
"The bond herein provided sh~ll he exhibited to any 
person interested, upon request. 
"14-2-2. Any person subject to the provisions of this chap-
ter, who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, 
or to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall be personally 
liable to all persons who have furnished materials or per-
formed labor under the contract for the reasonable value 
of such materials furnished or labor performed, not ex-
ceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed upon." 
At the pretrial it was stipulated that buildings had been 
built upon property owned by the defendants. It was further 
stipulated that none of the defendants had requested nor re-
quired the Comanche Construction Company to provide a bond. 
1R-28) 
The statutes in question were first passed by the Utah Leg-
islature in 191 5. Their constitutionality was upheld in 1917 in 
Rio Grande I .umber Company vs. Darke, 'o Utah 114. 167 P. 
241, L.R.A. l 9 1 8A, 1 19 3. They have been an integral part of 
law in the State of Utah since said date. 
The Lihc1 t:· Coal and Lumber Company \'S. Snow ( 1919 ). 
5 3 l!tah 2 7 8, 178 P. H l, an action against property owner for 
the value of materials used in the building constructed on own-
er's land, this court held the terms of the statute very broad and 
sweeping, saying: 
"If the owner of the bnd contracts for construction of 
the building on his land, the statute makes it his duty to 
comply with the terms if he desires to escape personai lia-
bility. The purpose of the statt•te is to prevent the owners 
of land from having their lands improved with materi:ils 
and labor furnished :md performed b:· third persons, and 
thus to enhance the value of such lands without becoming 
personally responsible for their reasonable value." 
History has shown that often juries and courts find it ex-
tremely hard to require property owners to pay a second time 
for the ,-alue of materials after once paying the contractor. 
Plaintiff knew it would have to face this feeling when it real-
ized it would have to present its claim before a jur:· composed 
of friends and fellow-tradesmen of the defendants; and maybe 
in no other case has the follo\\·ing admonition been more ap-
plicable, when in Kings Bros., Inc. vs. Utah Dry Kiln Com-
pany, Inc. (1962) 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P. 2d 2q., this court in 
remanding the case back to the trial court, commented on the 
\'VTitten memorandum of the trial judge, stating: 
"It made unmistakablv clear his disdain for the statute just 
quoted and that he r;garded them as conferring an unjusti-
fied privilege upon one class and a penalty upon another. 
It appears most likely that this idea was largely responsible 
for his ruling dismissing the action; that question was given 
quite thorough consideration by this court in the case of 
Rio Grande Lumber Company vs. Darke; without belabor-
ing the matter here we ref er to that decision and the rea-
soning given therein upon which the statute was held to 
be valid. Nothing has been suggested to persuade us that 
we should reconsider the latter." 
Here the burden was completelv upon the defendants to 
?O 
see that Comanche Construction Company was bonded before 
construction ever was commenced on their property. Since the 
[and owner is the one 'vho controls the money, h~ is the only 
one '' J:o can exercise the necessary control ov~r the contract~r 
that would force him into obtai~ing the bond. If a material-
man or laborer tried to insist upon such terms, the contractor 
\\'Ould merely hire new employees or move to different sup-
pliers. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE JURY'S 
ANS\VER TO QUESTIO~ THREE OF THE SPECIAL 
VERDICT, \VHEREIN THE JURY FOUND THAT AC-
CEPTA:·,/CE BY PLAINTIFF OF CONTRACTOR'S UN-
SECL1RED PROMISSORY NOTES CONSTTTCTED PAY-
.\lENT IN FULL. 
The general ntle of law is cle;irl!' statcJ, that the taking 
of a Lill, note or check is not payment unless it is agreed to 
be taken as such. In the absence of such :rn at:reement, it is only 
conditional payment dependent upon the payment of the p~­
per; and if the paper is dishonored, an action ma:- be maintain-
ed on the original i'ldebtedness. Ellison vs. Henion ( 192.0 ), 183 
Cal. 17 1, 1 90 P. 798, I 1 A. L. R. 444. 
In First National Bank of Portland vs. Nobie et al. ( 1946) 
179 Or. 26. 168 P. 2d 354, 169 A. L. R. 1426, the court said, 
"\Vhen a debtor gives his own check or promissory note 
to a creditor, prima facie the transaction is conditional pay-
ment only. But even in such a case the ultimate question 
is one of intention of the parties to the transaction." 
In Farmers and i\1erchants Bank \'S. Universal C. I. T. 
11955) 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P. 2d I04'· this court stated: 
"A great deal of argument is devoted to the question of 
whether or not the bank intended to accept the $z 1,ooo 
note as payment from Parsley, thus discharging appellant 
from the obligation. However, the trial court found that 
there was no agreement to that effect and the finding is 
supported by c~mpetent evidence. In the absence of such 
an agreement, the rule as set out in 40 Am. Jur, Payment, 
sec. 87, is: 
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" 'The general rule is that a note giv:::n by a debtor for 
a precedent debt "ill not oe held to extinguish the 
debt, in effect, hut "-ill he c1 imi dcrcd as conditional 
payment or as collateral sccurit\·, or as an acknnwl-
edgernent or memorandum of the amount :1scer::ained 
to lie due. The d0ctrine proceeds on the obviou
1 
ground that nothing can he justl:·; comidered as pav-
ment in fact but that which is in truth such, unl~ss 
something else is exprC'ssl:· agreed to be received in its 
place. That a mere pro!11ise to pa\· C•1!1not of itself bt 
re?ardcJ as an effecti,·e pa:·111ent is m.mife~t.' ,. 
The defendants clc,11h· foil in their burd:::~ of sho">in~ 
an agreement between pl;iintiff and Com:mche Constructin~ 
Company that acceptance by plaintiff of the two un1ecurc:d 
promissor:· notes would be payment in full. :\Ir. J. \V. Child 
testified it was never a;!"reed that the note<; \vnulJ he satisfac 
tion fur the full accounts recei\·at;le. At T-!:1 .. \Ir. ChilJ said. 
" . . . And I had him gfre me these rn o promissory note> 
which would, I felt, obligate him to ;~ivc me this additional 
money \\·hen he got it collected." At T-11-t, a~~ain .\Ir. Child 
stated, " . _ . I certain!:· did not take them in pa:·ment of the 
account." 
It is significant to note, that the trial court, after hearing 
all the evidence. ruled as :i matter of b w that the notes were 
not taken in satisfaction of Comanche Construction Company·, 
account, and refused to propound the defendants' requested 
guestions which set out the notes as a defense. (R-36) 
The defendants also clear!~- failed to show an:· dispute be-
tween plaintiff and Comanche Construction Compan~· as to the 
balance of the accounts receivable. 
The Re-statement of Contracts. Sec. 419, says: 
"\Vhen a contract is made for the ~atisfaction of a pre-ex-
isting contractural duty or duty to make compensation. the 
interpretation is assumed in case of doubt, if the pre-exist-
ing- duty is an undisputed duty, either to make compensa-
ti~n or. to pay a liquified sum of money, that only per-
formance of the subsel1uent contract will discharge the 
pre-existing debt; but if the pre-existing dutv is of another 
kind that the subsequent contract shall immediately dis-
charge the pre-existing duty and be substituted for it." 
If a dispute had existed between plaintiff and Comanche 
Construction Company over the amount of the account, it might 
be argued that the law of "Accord and Satisfaction" would ap-
ply. But, here again, the defendants would fail. No matter what 
agreement was reached for an "accord", the defendants failed 
r~ sho\\' any performance by Comanche Construction that would 
constitute a "satisfaction". 1 Am. Jur. zd 344, Sec. 47, sum-
marizes the law exactly when it states: 
"The accord is the agreement, the satisfaction is the exe-
cution or performance of such agreement. 1.Vhen an ac-
cord is followed by a sati5faction, it is a bar to the asscr-
ti(Jil of the original claim, but until so folJm·.-ed. it has no 
effect." 
See Browning \·s. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 94 
L'tah 5 32, 7 2 P. zd w6o, Rehearing denied 9·t Ctah 570, 80 P. 
zd HS. Also see 66 A. L. R. 352, for n:any citations in sup-
port of the general rule under mechanics' lien bw that the 
acceptance of the written obligations d the contractor or a 
third person, from the contractor, by one who has furnished 
him with labor or materials, is not of itself sufficient to pre-
clude him from claiming a lien on the improved or newly con-
mucted property. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED I~ ACCEPTING THE JURY'S 
,\~S\VER TO QCESTIO~ THREE OF THE SPECIAL 
\'ERDICT, \VHEREI~ THE COCRT FOUND THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY FR0.\1 THF DEFENDANTS 
\VAS BARRED BY £STOPPEL. 
Each defendant testified personal!\· that it was the assur-
ance given by plaintiffs employee, H. J. Rasmussen, to Mr. 
Uifford Blackham, during a telephone com·ersation on January 
z 3. 1961, that Comanche Construction Company's accounts were 
clear and that it was clear to go ahead and make final payment, 
that caused them to make the final payment to Comanche Con-
struction for their buildings. 
Plaintiff submits that neither in fact, nor in law, can the 
defendants claim the defense of estoppel against plaintiff. 
In Farmers and Merchants B nk U · I C 
(c. d S a · vs. 01versa . I. T., . 1te upra) this court said: 
"As stated in ]. T. F arg:i.son Cu. vs. Furst, 8 Cir, 2 ~ 7 F. 
306, 310: 
" 'Equitable estoppel is bottomed upon the notion that 
when one person makes representations to anothei 
which warrant the latter in actin~; in a given war. 
the one making such representations "ill not be pe·r-
mi~ted to change his position when such change "·ould 
bring about inequitable conset1uences to the other per-
son, \\·ho relied Pn the rcprcs:>ntJtions and acted there-
on in good faith. i< "' "' "' T!.ic rc:prcscllt,1tiom made 
must be in themseh:es sufficient to ,...._.,nrant the action 
taken, and their sufficiency is a judicial question. ft 
is not enough that the person who heard them deemed 
that he " ..ms "<.4.'arrmztcd in actillr.; as he cfid; t!.ie lanp:uage 
used ought of itself to fumisb the " ..:.:arrant. One man 
might comider himself 'l.l,\1/T,1med in acting upon rep-
resentations 7.l:holly i11mfficie7lt to move a more careful 
and prudent person.' " (emphasis ad<led) 
Mr. Clifford Blackham has been l\1anager of the Hatch-
ery and Brooder Divisions of .\Ioroni Feed Cornpan~' for fif-
teen years, a trained businessman. Comanche Construction Com-
p:rny had built a pole-type building for him personal!~' and haJ 
given him written lien waivers on the materials \vhen \Ir. 
Blackham made his final payment. 
After talking to the other defendants, l\lr. Blackham was 
aware of the delinquent labor pa)'ments, overdrafts at the bank, 
unpaid oil and lumber bills of Comanche Construction Com-
pany. He made the telephone call because he was concerned 
with the financial status of Comanche Construction Company. 
l\fr. Blackham was, in fact, in a much better position than 
plaintiff to know about Comanche Construction Company's fi-
nancial status. Under cross-examination, Mr. Blackham admitted 
that in substance his question to Mr. Rasmussen \\·as not wheth-
er all the materials were paid for but whether Comanche Con-
struction Company was in default with plaintiff. (T-zo7) 
The Moroni Feed Company building was not finished until 
,Vlarch 1, 1961. It is hard to believe that a businessman would 
not expect circumstances to have changed materially between 
January 2 Jfd and when final payment for the Moroni Feed 
Company building was made following its completion. Mr. 
Blackham did not make more inquiries. 
Defendants, D. A. Shand and Howard Willardsen, should 
look to :\tr. Blackham for help since he is the one that mislead 
chem. if anyone did. They, in fact, knrn: from Mr. Guy L. Pitt-
man that the materials in. their buildings were not paid for. Mr. 
Shand even made the final payment against the advice of his 
attorney. 
Defendant, Richard Jensen, must be charged with the same 
knowledbe, not only from what i\lr. Pittman told him but he 
stated he acted on what he was told bv Mr. Shand. 
The fact is, that all the def end ants .from one source or an-
other knew that plaintiff had not recci,·ed pa! ment for the ma-
terials in their buildings. It cannot follow that legally they can 
place the burden of their actions on the plaintiff. \Ir. Rasmus-
sen did nothing more than report to :\Ir. Blackham the present 
status of Comanche Construction Company as reflected by 
plaintiff's ledger card. which showe<l a credit balance on Jan-
uary 23, 1961. 
19 Am. Jur, Sec. 42, at page 640, says: 
"General principles: The doctrine of estoppel in pais is 
founded upon the principles of morality and fair dealing 
and is intended to subserve the ends of justice. It always 
presupposes error on one side and fault or fraud upon the 
other and some defect of which it would be inequitable for 
the party against whom the doctrine is asserted to take ad-
vantage. The essential elements of an equitable estoppel 
as related to the party estopped are: 
" ( 1) Conduct which amounts to a false representation 
or concealment of the material facts, or, at least which is 
calculated to convey the impression that facts are other-
wise than and incon~istent with those which the party sub-
sequentl!· attempts to assert; 
" ( 2) Intention or at least expectation that such conduct 
will be acted upon by the other party; 
" ( 3) Knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real 
facts. 
"As related to the party claiming the estoppel, thev are: 
"( 1) Lack of knowledge and of the means of knowl-
edge of the truth as to the facts in question; 
" ( 2) Reliance upon the conduct of the party e'topped; 
and 
" ( 3) Action based thereon of such a character as to 
change his position prejudiciallv.'' 
The plaintiff never falsely represented. The defendants 
never suffered from lack of knowledge or the means of g-aining 
knowledge. In fact, they merely had to follow the ad~·ice of 
their attorney after asking for it. All of the defendants had 
knowledge that at the time final payment was made the full 
value of the materials had not heen p:iid. 
POINT V 
THE JURY'S ANS\VERS TO THE INTERROGATO-
RIES OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT ARE NOT SUPPORT-
ED BY THE EVIDENCE, AND THE COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR THE PLAIN-
TIFF NOTWITHST ANDIKG THE SPECIAL VERDICT. 
Under Rule 49(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the trial court presented a special verdict ·with six written in-
terrogatories to the jury. Questions one, two, three and four 
were concerned with whether or not materials supplied by 
plaintiff had been used in constructing defendants' buildings and 
what the unpaid value of said materials might be. Questions five 
and six were directed to the telephone call. 
The jury, however, ignored their instructions and deciding 
law instead of facts, found for the defendants, in essence on 
the grounds of estoppel and by applying a rule of law rhau 
the trial court had refused to propound to them; i.e., accept-
ance of the notes by plaintiff constituted payment. 
On question one, the jury found that materials purchased 
by Comanche Construction Company from plaintiff \Vere used 
in constructing the defendants' buildings. 
On question two, the jury was asked to determine the un-
paid ,·alue of said material. The jury answered, "none." The ev-
idence will not support the determination. The trial court had 
ruled as a matter of law on the question of the notes, and a tel-
ephone call does not pay a debt. The telephone call may create 
a situation that would bar collection under estoppel, but as this 
court said in Farmers and Merchants Bank vs. Universal C. I. T. 
(Cited Supra), estoppel is a judicial question and not within 
the jury's jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff introduced undisputed evidence that the materials 
,, ere of the ,·alue claimed. There is no other evidence to ex-
plain the jury's answer, except the notes. 
Questions three and four were propounded by the trial 
court so that the jury could determine the facts necessary for 
granting a money judgment if the court should so decide. The 
jurv's answers to both questions were unresponsive. 
· · Questions five and six ,,·ent to validity of the telephone 
call between Clifford Blackham and plaintiff's employee, H. J. 
Rasmussen. Plaintiff submits that the evidence does not substan-
tiate the jury's answers. 
Therefore, based on the jurv's failure to follow the court's 
directions and their answers which are not supported by the 
evidence, the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for 
verdict notwithstanding the special verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. H. GRIFFITHS 
4962 South State Street 
Murray City, Utah 
Attornev for Plaintiff-Appellant 
